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Abstract A systemic risk measure is proposed accounting for links and mu-
tual dependencies between financial institutions utilising tail event informa-
tion. FRM (Financial Risk Meter) is based on Lasso quantile regression de-
signed to capture tail event co-movements. The FRM focus lies on understand-
ing active set data characteristics and the presentation of interdependencies
in a network topology. The FRM indices detect systemic risk at selected ar-
eas and identifies risk factors. In practice, FRM is applied to the return time
series of selected financial institutions and macroeconomic risk factors. We
identify companies with extreme ”co-stress”, and ”activators” of stress. We
present FRM@Americas and FRM@Europe as main examples. With the
SRM@EuroArea and the FRM@iT raxx we extend to the government bonds
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and credit default swaps. We also show FRM-implied recession probabilities to
predict recessions. Thereby, FRM indicates tail event behaviour in a network
of financial risk factors.
Keywords Systemic Risk · Quantile Regression · Financial Markets · Risk
Management · Network Dynamics · Recession
1 Introduction
Financial institutions and their interdependencies constitute a network that is
vital for modern economies. The resulting complexity of links between these
institutions which may be seen as risk factors may contribute to systemic risk.
For example, a trigger event, such as an economic shock or institutional dis-
tress, may cause spillover-effects that weakens not only the network stability
but also its functioning. These observations on the joint network dynamics
motivated researchers and practitioners to embed tail events into risk man-
agement.
Value at Risk is describing a tail event probability hosting exclusively one
single node. The CoVaR of Adrian:2016 considers the tail event probabil-
ity of node j conditional on the distress of node i, representing a bivariate
tail dependence system. The TENET Tail Event NETwork risk approach by
Haerdle:2016 and Zhu:2019 generalizes CoVaR further by involvement of a
network and thus accommodates all system nodes as risk factors. TENET ap-
plies quantile regression on macroeconomic risk factors and the set of network
node stock market information in a rolling window approach. The innovative
idea of TENET is to apply dimensionality reduction (in a semi-parametric set-
ting) via Lasso Tibshirani:1996 in a quantile regression context. In further
extending TENET, our paper proposes an augmented systemic risk measure
that condenses the high-dimensional tail stress into a single real value indi-
cator, FRM the Financial Risk Meter. For regulating authorities such as the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) this simple but augmented
indicator is of great benefit. The FRM is the average over the selected penal-
ization terms and is calculated at each time step and for each node, and its
size contains essential information on the active set of influential neighboring
nodes and on the contributors to systemic risk. The reason why this penalty
parameter is a condensation of different risk components is explained below
in section 2.1. Some of the technical implementation issues were discussed in
Yu:2017 which concern specifically the computationally intensive and thereby
time-consuming L1-norm quantile regression when done sequentially for a large
number of firms. The authors consider parallel computing in R, and their, the
codes are published on www.quantlet.de with keyword FRM.
The standard FRM is defined as the average over the series of the se-
lected penalization terms λ for the financial institutions under consideration.
The penalization parameters are based on an L1-norm (Lasso) quantile linear
regression, which are subsequently selected by the generalized approximate
cross-validation criterion (GACV) Yuan:2006 Standard FRM picks up the
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3429549
FRM Financial Risk Meter 3
τ = 0.05 tail event risk level, though a τ = 0.1 yields similar results. At each
trading day, the returns of roughly 100 largest publicly traded financial insti-
tutions at geographic areas (Americas and Europe) as well as selected macro-
economic risk variables, ranging from 1 January 2000 until 10 July 2019, are
entering the FRM technology. A 63 business days (i.e three months) rolling
window yields a λ series for each firm at a given date. The average of these
penalty parameters constitutes the standard FRM.
The FRM is a risk measure for joint tail events. Many other risk mea-
sures have been proposed and used in practice. For example, VIX is an im-
plied volatility based measure not reflecting joint tail event dynamics. As
mentioned above, CoVaR Adrian:2016 concentrates on a pair of risk fac-
tors. NBER based recession indicators detect turns in economic activity ex-
amining various measures of broad activity, such as real GDP, employment,
and real income. In conjunction with the NBER’s recession indicator, re-
cession probability indicators have been proposed so as to predict upcom-
ing riskier investment environments. For example Chauvet:2008 propose a
smoothed recession probability for the United States based on four variables:
non-farm payroll employment, the index of industrial production, real personal
income excluding transfer payments, and real manufacturing and trade sales.
Their recession probabilities are shown on the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis’s economic data platform, accessible here: https://fred.stlouisfed.
org/series/RECPROUSM156N. Similarly, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
proposes a yield curve slope based predictor of future real economic activity
and is based on the spread between interest rates on the ten-year US Trea-
sury note and the three month Treasury bill as outlined in Estrella: 1991
Estrella: 1996 More recently, communication and interaction on social me-
dia platforms as well as search queries have been included. For example,
Kristoufek:2013 examine searched items on Google Trends and their cor-
relation with stock riskiness. These methods thus tend to look at dynamics
and patterns of few data sets. The FRM framework has the advantage to ad-
dress simultaneously the dynamics and co-movements of highly-dimensional
networks. FRM also allows to unfold hidden dependency structures among
the nodes of a financial network.
FRM may, therefore be used to quantify high/low joint tail event risks
arising from single companies. Standard FRM is defined by the average of
penalty parameters. Focusing on the empirical distribution in addition to av-
erage penalty parameters enables researchers and practitioners to identify com-
panies with relatively high value of the Lasso penalty parameter λ, which, as we
discussed before, is an indicator of joint tail event risk. Financial institutions
with a high λj reading are high ”co-stress” entities. Those with a larger num-
ber of marginal impact on others are ”activators” of other identified ”activated
entities”. By displaying boxplots, financial nodes with extremely high/low tail
event dependencies with other companies are depicted, and the entire chain of
dependencies between nodes can be unfolded.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First the FRM is proposed:
a systemic risk measure based on joint tail events. Essentially, FRM is an
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3429549
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econometric technology for understanding tail dependence, where the penalty
term from the quantile regression is taken as an indicator for tail risk. Sec-
ond, FRM framework is successfully applied in empirical economic practice.
Here the focus is on two selected FRM indices, namely FRM@Americas and
FRM@Europe for the equity markets, and SRM@EuroArea as an applica-
tion to the asset class of government bonds. Augmenting them, for example
by simultaneously checking varieties of quantiles of FRM components, one
can monitor economic activity and network dynamics, and suggest further
improvements in portfolio risk management.
Through the FRM dynamics, one observes several peaks which correspond
to crises and other events. FRM peaks at the financial crises in 2000, 2008 and
2012. This observation motivates us viewing our FRM as a recession predictor.
The FRM is shown to predict upcoming recession periods and therefore serves
as an indicator for systemic risk in a variety of world regions. This result is
performed by the logistic regression model with the NBER recession indicator
as dependent variable and FRM as a key explanatory variable.
The research goals of this paper are correspondingly related to three as-
pects: (i) general risk market movement assessment, (ii) tail dependencies,
spillovers identification of an active set useful for regulatory purposes and
macro-prudential policy making (iii) provision of recession probabilities.
Here we summarize the major results. First, FRM correlates positively with
other measures of systemic risk and peaks around crises. Second, a detailed
inspection of the active set across time allows to detect the network’s nodes
presenting the highest risk of spillover. Regulatory entities in respective re-
gions are therefore capable of implementing circuit breaking measures such as
recapitalisations with aim to mute the emerging crisis’ severity. Third, FRM is
shown to predict upcoming recession periods and serves as a leading indicator
for systemic risk in a variety of world regions, the US and the EU market.
In fact, the financial crisis in 2008 is captured in late 2007 by FRM already,
when first indicators of distress appeared in financial markets. This strongly
suggests the inclusion of FRM to standard recession probability indicators in
as much as they might emerge from distress in financial markets directly, and
are only later captured by the more widely used macro-economic variables
based models.
This paper is structured as follows: after the FRM risk measure framework
is presented in Section 2, its economic and computational characteristics are
discussed in Section 3. Empirical economic research results are provided in
Section 4 and finally Section 5 concludes.
The underlying codes have been written in the environment of R soft-
ware as developed by R Core Team:2019 They can be downloaded at www.
quantlet.de, indicated with in this paper for convenience.
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2 FRM Systemic Risk Measure Framework
In economic tail risk management FRM offers an accessible and compre-
hensive measure for systemic risk measurement. In this section, the under-
lying methodology is presented and then FRM is defined. Since the high-
dimensional financial network data exhibit non-linearities in time and space
Haerdle:2018aHaerdle:2016b our framework utilises a moving-window based
quantile regression approach.
2.1 Modelling Framework
FRM is based on financial institutions stock market returns as well as a set of
macroeconomic risk factors, where the latter are conditioning variables such
as volatility, credit spreads and yield curve slope inspired by the systemic
risk measure CoVaR by Adrian: 2016 which is one step further from an
institution’s own VaR measure. For more details on VaR see Haerdle:2019
While the CoVaR approach yields a systemic risk measure associated with one
particular financial institution relative to the financial system, thus the VaR
of the financial sector conditional on this financial institution being in distress,
the FRM aims to simultaneously capture all interdependencies in one single
number. Consider J companies and M macroeconomic risk factors at a given
trading day t ∈ {n+ 1, . . . , T} with n denoting the estimation window size and
T the number of time series observations. Linear quantile Lasso regression for
return series X is given by
Xj,t = αj +A
>
j,tβj + εj,t (1)
with Aj,t =
(
X−j,t
Mt
)
a p = J + M − 1 dimensional vector of covariates, col-
lecting the J − 1 dimensional vector of returns of all other companies except
company j and the M dimensional vector of macroeconomic risk factors the
index j ∈ {1, . . . , J}. Correspondingly, vector β collects p underlying parame-
ters, Haerdle:2016.
The regression is performed using an L1-norm penalisation with parameter
λj , known as the least absolute shrinkage and selection operater (Lasso) by
Tibshirani:1996. The current company’s λj are estimated through a modifi-
cation of Lasso in a quantile regression setting Koenker:1978 detailed further
by Li:2008 and Belloni:2011 where the optimization is solved with
min
αj ,βj
{
n−1
n∑
t=1
ρτ
(
Xj,t − αj −A>j,tβj
)
+ λj ‖βj‖1
}
(2)
with check function
ρτ (u) = |τ − I {u ≤ 0}| |u|γ (3)
given tail risk level τ , where γ = 1 corresponds to quantile regression employed
here and γ = 2 to expectile regression. The linear quantile regression model
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is related to residual size, the condition of the design matrix and the active
set. This directly follows the work by Osborne:2000 deriving a formula for
Lasso’s penalisation parameter λ in a linear regression context, and is then
extended to penalised quantile regression.
Treating λ as a fixed value in the objective function of the penalized regression
f(β, λ) =
12
n∑
i=1
(
Yi −X>i β
)2
+ λ
p∑
j=1
|βj |
 , (4)
then the function f(β, λ) is convex in parameter β. Moreover, with diverging
β we observe that f(β, λ) → ∞. Hence there exists at least one minimum of
the function f(·, λ). According to Osborne:1985 this minimum is attained in
β̂(λ) if and only if the null-vector 0 ∈ Rp is an element of the sub-differential
∂f(β, λ)
∂β
= −X>(Y −Xβ) + λu(β), (5)
where u(β) = (u1(β), . . . , up(β))
> is defined as uj(β) = 1 if βj > 0, uj(β) = −1
if βj < 0 and uj(β) ∈ [−1, 1] if βj = 0. Then, for β̂(λ) as a minimizer of f(β, λ)
the following has to be satisfied
0 = −X>{Y −Xβ̂(λ)}+ λu(β̂(λ)), (6)
Here we denote the estimator of a parameter vector β as a function of the
penalization parameter λ. This dependency follows from the formulation of
the penalized regression method and its objective function (4), where we first
select λ and then search for β̂(λ) which minimizes (4). Using the fact that
u(β)>β =
∑p
j=1 |βj | = ||β||1, where || · ||1 denotes L1-norm of a p-dimensional
vector, (6) can be further rewritten in the formula
λ =
{Y −Xβ̂(λ)}>Xβ̂(λ)
||β̂(λ)||1
. (7)
The identity (7) leads us to consider possible constituents which influence
the value of parameter λ and therein its dynamics when treated in a time-
varying framework. The following three effects are then related to the size of
λ:
1. size of residuals of the model;
2. absolute size of the coefficients of the model, ||β||1;
3. singularity of a matrix X>X.
The second effect can also be translated into the effect of a number of nonzero
parameters the so-called active set of the model, q = ||β||0 =
∑p
j=1 I(βj 6= 0),
where || · ||0 stands for L0-norm on Rp and I(·) is an indicator function. As
a measure of the third structure, the condition number κ(X>X) defined as the
ratio φmax(X
>X)/φmin(X
>X), the maximum and the minimum eigenvalue
of the matrix X>X, can be used.
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Similarly, one can derive formulae for the penalization parameter λ in
a quantile regression problem (2) and (3). Following Li:2008
λ =
θ>Xβ̂(λ)
||β̂(λ)||1
, (8)
where θ = (θ1, . . . , θn)
> satisfies the following
θi =

τ if Yi −X>i β̂(λ) > 0;
−(1− τ) if Yi −X>i β̂(λ) < 0;
∈ (−(1− τ), τ) if Yi −X>i β̂(λ) = 0.
(9)
Hence, we observe that λ depends on cardinality of the active set q, which
is again influenced by the correlation structure of the design matrix.
The optimized value of λ is found by cross-validation and will be dis-
cussed in 10 and 11. Since equation (2) has an L1 type loss function and an
L1-norm penalty term, the estimation deals with an L1-norm quantile optimi-
sation. There are several options to select λ. One method is by one of the three
forms of cross-validation: k-fold, leave-one-out and generalized cross-validation
method, see e.g. Tibshirani:1996 Shown by Hastie: 2009 cross-validation
is a widely used method for estimation of prediction error, but Leng:2006 ar-
gue methods of choosing penalization parameter based on prediction accuracy
are in general not consistent when variable selection is considered. Similarly
Wang:2009 arrive to the same conclusion by study of asymptotic behaviour
of the generalized cross-validation to Akaike’s information criterion (AIC); it is
efficient if one is interested in the model error, but inconsistent in selecting the
true model. The second widely used method of estimating λ is the Bayesian
information criterion (BIC), and generalized approximate cross-validation cri-
terion (GACV). For a longer discussion, see Haerdle:2016 Modified selection
criteria for penalized quantile regression which were used by Li:2008 are BIC
for quantile regression presented by Koenker:1994
BIC(λ) = log
[
n−1
n∑
i=1
ρτ{Yi −X>i β̂(λ)}
]
+
log(n)
2n
d̂f(λ), (10)
and GACV as introduced by Yuan:2006
GACV (λ) =
n∑
i=1
ρτ{Yi −X>i β̂(λ)}
n− d̂f(λ)
, (11)
where d̂f(λ) stands for the estimated effective dimension of the fitted model.
Li:2008 argued that the number of interpolated observations Yi denoted by
E is a plausible measure for this quantity, i.e. d̂f(λ) = |E|. In terms of statisti-
cal efficiency, GACV outperforms BIC, see Yuan:2006 . In implementing the
FRM model we utilise the later approach.
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Finding a feasible solution of the optimization problems (2) can be computa-
tionally demanding, since one has to check all combinations of values of the
tuning parameter λ and its respective model parameter estimates β̂(λ). Only
after all possible combinations are tracked, the particular method of choosing
λ̂ can be applied. The first algorithm for finding solution of Lasso was pre-
sented by Tibshirani:1996 in his work introducing the Lasso method itself.
Then Osborne:2000 developed an algorithm which works not only for the
case where p < n but also n < p. For the quantile regression case, solutions
were proposed by Belloni:2011 and Li:2008 . The second is applied in this
paper, since one is interested in modeling tail event dependencies when deal-
ing with systemic risk evaluations. Formally, the optimal level λj for company
j ∈ {1, . . . , J} is selected based on the minimization
min
λj
ρτ
(
Xj,t − αj −A>j,tβj
)
n− d
(12)
where d is a measure of the effective dimensionality of the fitted model; it is
the trace of the hat matrix with entries (t, q) given by ∂
(
αj −A>j,tβj
)
/∂Xj,q,
q ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The advantage of GACV is that it also works for the high-
dimensional case, which occurs when the selected moving window size n is
smaller than the number of parameters p as often encountered in risk man-
agement practice.
2.2 Financial Risk Meter (FRM)
Minimisation of (12) yields for each node a λj gauging dimensionality versus
the size of the residuals as discussed in subsection 2.1. The distribution of
the λj ’s in a moving window brings therefore important information on the
network dependencies among the financial nodes. The standard FRM is sim-
ply the mean of these λj . The distribution of the λj shed light on the general
market movement and provide information for macro-prudential decision mak-
ers related to the network dynamics. FRM may therefore be used to identify
above average and high joint tail event risks arising from single companies.
Companies with high λj exhibit common high stress levels as the companies
at the origin of the crisis. Such a company therefore is coined as having high
”co-stress”. Further, the FRM’s set up can always identify the respective com-
pany j in question, which is referred to as ”co-stress ID” through this paper.
What is more, there is information in the active set that can be used to further
the understanding around likely spill-overs in the financial network. Financial
institutions with high counts in active sets of other financial institutions could
be ”activators” of systemic stress and can be seen as major contributors of
systemic risk. The first line of marginal influence are called ”activated enti-
ties”. We give an example in Chapter 4.3
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3429549
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The FRM is defined as
FRM = J−1
J∑
j=1
λj (13)
in each rolling window for j companies, and the distribution of individual λj
is best shown in boxplot format, such as in Figure 1. While mean and me-
dian do not deviate much throughout the respective crisis periods, the stan-
dard distribution of λj increases strongly. It is seven times bigger end for
FRM@Americas end of 2008 compared to early 2007. It is about three times
bigger early 2012 for FRM@Europe compared to early 2011 and here as well
mean and median of λj move closely together.
3 FRM Data and Computational Characteristics
The most influential economic areas globally attracting the largest financial
institutions are the exchange markets of Americas and Europe. The list of
selected companies are financial institutions that have at some point been an
active constituent of the selected stock market indices, of which there are 612
in the Americas, and 289 in Europe. The list of macroeconomic risk factors
shown are shown in Table 2 in the Appendix.
3.1 FRM Data Compilation
For both markets studied and over the horizon, all financial institution con-
stituent of respective regions’ equity market indices are compiled and prices
as well as market capitalisations in USD are obtained from the Bloomberg
database. For both FRM@Americas and FRM@Europe, index constituents
were available since January 2000 and form the start of the study. The macroe-
conomic risk factors are loaded in line with these data sets for the respective
markets.
FRM@Americas is composed of financial institutions from the US’ S&P
1500 Composite Index, and from the Canadian TSX Toronto Composite Index,
resulting in 612 financial institutions, and six macroeconomic risk factors, with
daily data from 20000103 to 20190710 (4910 trading days). Estimation results
are available from 20000403 (the 64th day of the series) until 20190710 (4847
trading days).
FRM@Europe, the financial institutions from the S&P 600 Europe have
been selected, representing 289 companies from 17 European countries and are
more heterogeneous compared to FRM@Americas. Seven macroeconomic risk
factors were selected, and daily data ranges from 20000104 to 20190710 (5025
trading days). The estimation results are available from 20000331 (the 64th
day of the series) until 20190710 (4962 trading days).
The conditioning macro variables are chosen in line with Adrian:2016 so
as to capture common exposure to exogenous aggregate macroeconomic risk
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Fig. 1 Boxplot of the distribution if individual Lambdas
The top boxplot shows the FRM@Americas during 2007 to 2009, the bottom one
FRM@Europe 2011 to 2012, both on a monthly basis.
factors. Generally those are the change in front end yield and slope of the yield
curve, the change in credit spread, the equity market return, the real estate
sector return and the change in equity market option implied volatility levels.
In the case of FRM@Europe, we include the Euro Area member country spe-
cific government credit risk spread of Italian ten-year versus German ten-year
government bonds. Table 2 summarizes the input variables in the Appendix.
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3.2 FRM Computational Characteristics
While reporting, processing and preparing empirical results, three basic steps
are identified: (a) FRM statistics and data, (b) FRM statistics and estimation
and (c) FRM results and reporting. In the first part, we select the reference
stock market indices for respective regions and obtain their past and present
index constituents, so also include financial institutions that failed due to poor
performance. This allows us to prevent survivorship bias when only studying
currently existing index members, in line with Elton:1996 analysis on mutual
fund performance. We then download their closing prices, and market capitali-
sation at closing prices. In addition we load the macroeconomic risk factors for
the respective studied period. We calculate the daily returns of these matrices
of levels.
Subsequently, and on a daily basis, the stock price and macroeconomic risk
factor returns are selected for the largest J companies over a moving window
of s trading days for selected r days between start and end date of the study.
The resulting estimates of λj , cj and the active set vector βj are stored in the
estimation matrix.
Finally, these results can be studied by themselves, or applied to further studies
as done here in this study for estimation of recession probabilities by economic
region.
For convenience, the key ingredients of each step of the FRM algorithm are
summarized in Table 3 in the appendix.
4 Economic Applications
Within this empirical study, two stock markets are focused on: FRM@Americas
and FRM@Europe. While earlier versions of the FRM measure have been
studied previously for the US, see for example Haerdle:2016 this present
study has four key improvements to extend and enrich the analysis. First, we
improve the measure by allowing to select the biggest J financial institutions
on a given day, thereby preventing a possible survivorship bias. As any po-
tential crisis management approach necessitates the detection of the specific
financial institutions at risk of influencing others, or being influenced by others
to a large extend, the inclusion of failed institutions during past crises allows
the detailed study of co-movements of these failed institutions at the origin of
a financial crisis. Second, we apply this measure to the European stock mar-
ket, specifically to the S&P 600 Europe, representing 17 European countries:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland
and the United Kingdom. This results in the FRM@Europe and permits to
capture the financial market’s interconnected structure across the European
economic region. In a similar fashion, the FRM@Americas represents the
most liquid US but also Canadian financial institutions as the most liquid de-
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3429549
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Fig. 2 FRM time series from 2000 until 2019
veloped North American markets. Both modelling and computational set-ups
allow us to detect the active set, and the co-stress IDs.
Third, we apply the FRM to recession probability estimation, so as to enlarge
and complement the current set of widely used recession probability estima-
tion methods. Fourth, we apply the FRM technology to another asset class of
government debt, which we name the Sovereign Risk Meter SRM. We study
the tail event network dynamics of Euro Area government debt during the
Eurozone debt crisis (SRM@EuroArea) and show how spill-over can be de-
tected. Averaging the SRM@EuroArea and the FRM@Europe indicates at
how a comprehensive systemic risk measure encompassing further asset classes
could be constructed. Lastly, we give a brief outlook on further implications
of the FRM with regards to macro-prudential policy making, and applications
for portfolio risk managers.
4.1 CoStress, Activators and Network Dynamics
The first observation from Figure 2 is that the FRM peaks right when crises
become systemically important. Figure 2 shows the FRM time series in both
the Americas and Europe from 2000 until 2019. The peaks are, most obviously,
around the 2008 financial crisis, but also around other periods of elevated sys-
temic risk. Such periods are the US’ 2001 recession around the Dot-Com bubble
implosion, and in the case of Europe around the 2011 Euro Area government
debt crisis. Importantly, one can observe the FRM@Americas to rise syn-
chronously in 2011, pointing out that global linkages in the financial industry
are well pick up by the risk measure.
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Fig. 3 Normalised risk measures for FRM@Europe, VSTOXX and CISS
In comparison to other risk measures, Haerdle:2016b and Yu:2017 have
shown co-movements for the US’ version of the FRM. The FRM@Europe
being a novelty, we show the EuroStoxx 50 Volatility Index (VSTOXX) and
the ECB’s CISS (Hollo:2012 Euro Area Systemic Stress Indicator Compos-
ite Index) in comparison to the FRM measure for Europe in Figure 3. The
VSTOXX is calculated by Deutsche Börse and similar to the S&P 500’s VIX
Index is based on implied volatility on options with a rolling 30 day expiry.
The CISS is a composite indicator by the ECB’s Macro-prudential Research
Network MaRs, based on 15 mainly market based and equally weighted fi-
nancial stress measures. Around the 2007-2009 crisis period, one can observe
the CISS to move earlier. This is probably due to the fact that starting in
August 2007 already, the ECB had to use emergency liquidity provision to
help stabilise the system as spreads between secured and unsecured money
market rates widened strongly Quint:2017 This would likely be picked up in
some of the CISS components, such as money market spread moves as well as
foreign exchange moves, which are not captured by the currently calculated
FRM indices.
The FRM@Americas and FRM@Europe data sets were constraint by
the availability of index constituents information, going back to 2000 only.
A more complete set is available back to 1990 for the S&P 500 (SPX), the
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Fig. 4 FRM S&P 500 time series from 1990 to 2019, 25 largest financial institutions
result of which is shown in Figure 4. At the start of the series, only about 25
financial institutions were index constituents and we restrict this study to the
largest 25. On average, those 25 make up around 74% of the overall financial
institutions’ market capitalisation. While the FRM@SPX peaks again in 2008
as expected, previous crises were well captured as well. Most notably, there
are local maxima around the early 1990s recession, the Asian crisis 1997, the
Russian crisis 1998, and again a peak around the recession in 2001 and the
so-called Dot-Com bubble implosion.
The FRM’s key advantage however lies in its network based information,
in that on the one hand, the overall FRM is a first indication of systemic
risk, but on the other hand, the composition is known as well. The financial
institutions with high λj readings are so called high co-stress entities, whose
identity is known - the so called co-stress ID. There is even further information
in the active set with which the identification of activators of systemic risk are
known and the likely spread of contagion to the next activated entities.
To give an example in both regions, a closer look at periods of distress is
undertaken, specifically the period between 2007 and 2009 in the Americas,
and between 2011 and 2012 in Europe. Over both time horizons, the FRM
is estimated with the same hyperparameters, only that the number of largest
financial institutions is set at 25, which is shown in the top left chart in Figure
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Fig. 5 FRM@Americas between 2007 and 2009 with a variety of settings and 25 financial
institutions
5 and 6. Both figures also show additionally the change in hyperparameter
τ , the number of iterations at 100, and shortening the moving window to 31
trading days, always on the same 25 largest financial institutions. The results
are similar in shape, but the ordinates’ scales differ. The FRM seems to be
robust with regards to a variety of argument settings.
In order to visualise the networks connection and the strength thereof, we
take the active sets of each financial institution j into a weighted adjacency
matrix, where the active set is derived from the usual 63 day moving win-
dow. From this matrix we can derive the network’s nodes’ centrality and link
strength, see Figure 7 for an example of FRM@Americas. Here we follow
Nieminen:1974 for a simple and general measure of total network centrality.
The dates chosen are right ahead of the Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. offer
by JPMorgan Chase on 14 March 2008 when the earlier was failing due to in-
volvement in the subprime mortgage crisis, and 5 September 2008 just ahead
of the US Treasury announcement to take over the mortgage buyers FNMA
and FHLMC, and a weak ahead of the Lehman Brothers failure. Between the
two networks, one can observe the increasing centrality of Wachovia, which
later had to merge with Wells Fargo (WFC) so as to prevent further market
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Fig. 6 FRM@Europe between 2011 and 2012 with a variety of settings and 25 financial
institutions
disruption. Also, AIG’s node has increased in size, reflecting the market’s risk
perception towards the insurer. AIG received a 85 billion USD two-year loan
by the Federal Reserve so as to prevent its bankruptcy and thereby further
stress to the global economy. An earlier dealing with these potential activators
of crisis could have possibly reduced the contagion to the system later on.
As for the high and low co-stress ID’s on September 5th, the top five co-
stress identities where in descending order Visa Inc, Toronto Dominion Bank,
US Bancorp, American Express Co, and American International Group (AIG)
Inc. On the low side, Mastercard Inc, Bank of America Corp, Bank of Nova
Scotia, Goldman Sachs Group Inc and Merrill Lynch Co Inc.
We also show the financial network in the case of Europe in Figure 8 on
20 January 2012, just after the downgrade of France by credit rating agency
Standard & Poors including eight other Eurozone countries. Also that same
day, Greece and private investor talks had stalled. Quite apparent are the Ital-
ian banks UniCredit SpA (UCG) and Intesa Sanpaolo SpA (ISP) and link’s
strength between them, reflecting the so called peripheral country risk percep-
tion that spilled over from the Eurozone government debt crisis. We will look
the Eurozone government debt crisis in detail in section 4.2.
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4.2 The Sovereign Risk Meter
The FRM technology can by applied to other asset classes. The discussion
on FRM@Europe on the Euro Area’s government debt crisis motivates us
to an analysis of the network behaviour of the Euro Areas government debt
markets. For this task, we take the changes in constant maturity ten year
government debt levels of eleven Euro Area countries, namely Belgium, Spain,
Italy, Austria, Germany, France, Portugal, Ireland, Finland, the Netherlands
and Greece. As for macroeconomic risk factors we take a reduced set including
Euro Area REIT returns, Euro Stoxx 50 returns, Euro Stoxx 50 Volatility
Index returns, the Germany treasury yield curve slope, and finally a liquidity
measure consisting of ten year Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) ten year
yields as a spread to German ten year treasury yields. The latter are both
ultimately guaranteed by the German government, however differ in market
size and thus liquidity. We will refer to it as the Sovereign Risk Meter (SRM),
and for the exemplary case of the Euro Area: SRM@EuroArea. Figure 9
shows the SRM@EuroArea for τ = 0.05.
As expected, the SRM is soaring during the 2011-2012 Euro Area gov-
ernment debt crisis, which culminated in Greece’s debt restructuring deal
in March 2012. However, the SRM@EuroArea reaches similarly high lev-
els around the Greek bailout referendum on July 5, 2015 on the acceptance
of the bailout conditions in the country’s government debt crisis. When look-
ing at the yield level developments throughout 2014 and into the referendum
2015, the SRM’s technology is exemplified. Whilst Greece’ yield levels sell off
in the second half of 2014 already, the SRM level only increases when the other
countries’ yield levels jointly move higher by end of April 2015, right when the
issue became systemic in the eyes of investors, see figure 10.
Further applications in the realm of bond yield levels will be the focus of
future work. Such applications could be to emerging market government debt
denominated in local or foreign currency, or local government debt in the case
of China.
In a similar fashion to the ECB’s equally weighted CISS measure, the
average of normalised level of the FRM@Europe and SRM@EuroArea shown
in Figure 11. Both have very similar patterns, but our measure captures better
the systemic risk increase around June 2013, when equity index provider MSCI
Inc. reclassified Greece as an emerging market, given failure to qualify on
several criteria for market accessibility. Again, this points to the advantage of
including the FRM technology when estimating system risk levels.
For the Euro Area policy makers, understanding the networks key nodes
is of importance. Figures 12 and 13 show the total degree of centrality early
May 2015, when the FRM was at local lows, on July 3rd 2015 just ahead of
the Greek referendum. The spread of contagion to Italy is clearly visible. As of
July 10th, 2019, the centrality graph points to much calmer times, see Figure
14.
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4.3 FRM and Credit Default Swaps
We now want to take it one step further, by calculating the FRM on credit
default swap (CDS) spread changes of specific CDS index members. Credit
default swaps have been widely used as a key tool in risk management over
the last two decades. It is a financial swap agreement between a protection
buyer and a protection seller on a specific reference bond. The protection seller
receives a series of payments (”spread”) and the protection buyer receives a
payoff if there is a default on the underlying asset. The spread is an expression
of expected loss given default and the probability of default. The maturities
of these contracts range from short one year to ten year and longer, and are
available on sovereign debt issuers from developed and emerging markets, cor-
porate debt issuers, and even supranational agency issuers.
Our focus is on financial institutions and specifically the Markit iTraxx
credit default swap indices on iTraxx European Financials Senior, which in-
cludes currently 30 of the most liquid equally weighted senior subordination
financial names. Starting 2004 iTraxx European Financials Senior roll in series
every six months in March and September, and a polling procedure obtains
the constituents with index rule considerations regarding outstanding debt,
corporate events, business sector and so on. For our study, we obtained the
iTraxx European Financials Senior index constituents for all series starting in
September 2005 and up to the current series 32 for five year maturity CDS.
We then obtain the CDS spread history of each if these historical constituents.
The first series start with 25 index members, but they currently encompass
30 index members. The macroeconomic risk factors selected were Euro Area
REIT returns, Euro Stoxx 600 returns, Euro Stoxx 50 Volatility Index returns,
the Germany treasury one year yield level and curve slope to ten year bonds,
the corporate credit spread and the yield spread between German and Italian
ten year government bond yields.
Figure 15 shows the FRM@iT raxx as an example for CDS spread change
tail event network behaviour. Importantly, the aforementioned August 2007
liquidity stress situation is very well captured by a sharp rise in the FRM,
spiking to levels close to what will later be observed in 2008. Judging by the
FRM, there was imminent risk of a systemic crisis and the ECB was correctly
assessing its need to address the banks’ provision of credit and liquidity.
Figure 16 shows the FRM@iT raxx adjacency matrix as of 07 October
2019. The columns show company j’s marginal contribution to the other net-
work members’ returns. In rows, we see each company j’s marginal return
contribution from the remaining companies. In Figure 17 the exemplary spill
over effects from activator Deutsche Bank (DB) are being depicted, indicating
the potentially ”activated entities”. In fact, DB only has to significant marginal
return contributions in the tail event scenario, namely to Swiss Re (SRENVX)
and Commerzbank (CMZB), the latter probably less surprising. CMZB itself
has a sizeable marginal return contribution to Allianz (ALVGR), which it-
self impacts large parts of the network. The total network degree centrality is
again depicted in Figure 18. Expectedly, the linkages between national banking
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and insurance sectors are generally strong, for example Aviva and the British
banking sector, or between Swiss Re and Zurich Insurance as well as UBS and
Credit Swiss in the Swiss case.
4.4 FRM as the Predictor of Recessions
The FRM dynamics in Figure 2 reveals several peaks in the FRM series.
”Peaks” at the financial crises in 2000, 2008 and 2013 motivate us to study
the role of the FRM in the recession prediction. There exists a variety of re-
cession indicators, such as the term structure of yield curve or interest rate,
monetary policy-related predictors, that are employed as recession predictors
(see Estrella:1991 and Estrella: 1996). These indicators carry information
about the monetary and bond markets, whereas the FRM is measuring the
strengths of tail dependence of the entire financial system.
We collect the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) recession
indicator data and the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). More
detail can be found at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/USREC and
https://cepr.org/content/. According to the NBER, a recession is a sig-
nificant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more
than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment,
industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales. The recession indicator has a
value of 1 in a recessionary period, while a value of 0 indicates an expansion-
ary period. The complete recession data is spanning from 1855 up to today,
on a monthly basis. As for Europe, the CEPR analogously publishes recession
periods following the NBER’s trough method.
To examine whether the FRM can be a predictor for the NBER recession
indicator or for the CEPR indicator, we perform a univariate linear logistic
regression. Between the predictor, the FRM at the past k-month, and the
recession probability as follows
log
P(Yt = 1|xt−k; θ)
P(Yt = 0|xt−k; θ)
= θ0,k + θ1,kxt−k where k = 1, ..., 6 (14)
where xt−k is the FRM@Americas (FRM@Europe) at time t− k which can
be obtained by averaging the daily FRM within the t− k month, Yt is NBER
(CEPR) recession indicator with binary value 1 or 0 at time t to indicate the
presence (Yt = 1) or absence (Yt = 0) of a recession. To be precise, we only
use the t − k predictor, since this was more significant compared to using all
t− 1 to t− k predictors. After aligning the two FRM with the recession series
in the Americas and Europe, we end up a time frame from January 2000 to
July 2019 on a monthly basis. An alternative is to take the median of daily
FRM in month t− k, but the two are not meaningfully different.
Table 1 reports the regression coefficients, θ1,k in (14) as k = 1, ..., 6, and
documents their statistical significance and R-square values. This indicates
that FRM is capable of predicting the upcoming recession up to t+ 6 month,
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with the R-squared value from 10%(lag 6) up to 36% (lag 1) in the US reces-
sion forecast. As can be understood, the statistical significance declines as the
lag increases. The forecast in the EU market exhibits the comparable perfor-
mance.
Having the estimated logistic regression, one may calculate the FRM-implied
recession probability. This implied recession probability indicates the proba-
bility of recession attributed to the quantified systemic risk measure, at 5%
level of FRM. Figure 19 depicts the recession probability implied by the gen-
erated FRM, the FRM series and the dated recession periods. In order to have
more recession periods under consideration, we would need to extend to the
next NBER recession in the early 1990s. In Chapter 4.1 we lengthened the
FRM back to 1990 for the US’ S&P 500. In Figure 21 the resulting recession
probability is shown for the the longer 30 year period between 1990 and 2020,
now encompassing three official NBER recession periods. The FRM derived
recession probability captures well the spill over from the Asian Crisis 1997-
1998. There is also a rise in recession probability around 1990 on the back of
the restrictive US Federal Reserve’s policy mix. However, given the limited
availability of index membership data prior to 1990s, there is not enough data
to perform the univariate linear logistic regression on in the early stages.
Figure 22 compares the recession probability obtain from the FRM for the
US with those obtained from smoothed recession probability calculation by the
St. Louis Federal Reserve, as well as the yield curve slope derived probability by
the New York Federal Reserve. Around 2008, the FRM recession probability
indicator rises earlier than the St.Louis Fed’s, however later than the New
York Fed’s yield curve implied probability. Against that, the FRM captures
the 2001 recession earlier than the other two measures. What is more, the FRM
derived recession probability captures the spill over from the 2011 Euro Area
debt crisis, which was impacting European banks especially. This supports
the FRM’s capability to indicate stress stemming from global linkages in the
financial network. More recently, the FRM’s recession probability has risen
somewhat, but less so compared to the New York Fed’s recession indicator.
In sum, the FRM shows a predictability to an imminent recession and
serves therefore as an indicator for systemic risk in a variety of world regions.
We, therefore, suggest that FRM can be considered in the inclusion of the
list of leading indicators and is informative in terms of predicting upcoming
recessions.
4.5 Further implications and extensions
With the onset of the financial crisis 2008, and its implications on the sys-
temic risk character of the financial market and the functioning thereof, more
focus has shifted to so called macro-prudential policy making. For example,
the European Central Bank has included macro-prudential policies aiming at
risk build-up prevention, to improve the financial sector’s resilience and limit
contagion effects, and lastly improvement of market participants’ incentives.
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US recession EU recession
k-month ahead coefficient std R2 coefficient std R2
1 69.43∗ 14.44 0.36 77.07∗ 13.95 0.27
2 54.87∗ 11.55 0.29 65.12∗ 12.30 0.22
3 47.12∗ 9.84 0.23 56.65∗ 11.18 0.18
4 42.12∗ 8.77 0.19 50.83∗ 10.45 0.14
5 35.83∗ 7.59 0.14 45.68∗ 9.86 0.12
6 29.77∗ 6.70 0.10 38.56∗ 9.16 0.09
Table 1 Predicting future recession
The coefficient θ1,k defined in (14, the standard error of coefficient and R-square value are
reported. * indicates significance at the 1% level.
For more details, see https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/tasks/stability/
html/index.en.html. Similarly, the Federal Reserve has included a Division
of Financial Stability, which includes macro-prudential analysis ultimately
with the aim to improve the financial market’s resilience. This inclusion of
macro-prudential variables has also been studied in academia. For example
Edge:2017 analyse the implementation of macro-prudential policies across
countries and the functioning of respective institutions tasked to improve
financial stability. But already pre-crisis, Bodie: 2007 outlined the neces-
sity to include contingent claims analysis and their sensitivity to shocks and
the resulting necessity for macro-prudential policy sets. Post-crisis, a good
overview of macro-prudential policies and its benchmarking is given laid out
by Lombardi:2016
There are two ways in which the FRM helps to improve on financial stability
stability management. First, the FRM is an aggregated tail event network’s
risk measure, which, as shown in the previous sections, is an early detector of
financial distress in the market. As λj rise, and with that, the overall FRM,
the J companies returns are driven by a decreasing number of companies and
macroeconomic risk factors, that is, a smaller active set. Under the assump-
tions that company returns reflect the changing investment behaviour into
a more distressed scenario, and early indication thereof is available with the
FRM. Secondly, the FRM is a rich measure in that one can infer which nodes
of the financial network are in distress, and the potential chain of spillover
into the general financial market. By analysis of the active set, the financial
institutions with significant marginal effect on returns of a large number other
companies can be detected, the so-called ”activators”. Further, the individ-
ual λj indicates that select company j is a risk of driven further by external
factors, be it other financial institutions or macroeconomic risk factors. This
enhances the understanding of empirical properties of tail event network stress
unfolding.
In fact, the FRM addresses several points which the BIS’ Gadanecz:2015
raise. Not only does the FRM show the financial cycle dynamics at the early
stages of distress, thereby giving necessary lead time to decision makers, but
it also indicates where exactly in the financial system network to put in place
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measures that can prevent a crisis at the early stages. By not only focusing
on banks, but by including the entire financial industry, the FRM measure
detects appearing risks in non-bank financial sectors. Systemic risks emerging
in the so called ”shadow banking system”, which is in need of regulation and
oversight, can be detected by looking at sub-sector aggregation of the FRM’s
composition. The shadow banking system is described by the Federal Reserve’s
Financial Stability Board as credit intermediation involving entities and ac-
tivities outside the regular banking system. By inclusion of a broad set of
financial sector entities, the FRM captures risks emerging from any potential
subsector. Secondly, a truncated version of the FRM can be analysed, by for
example only including the bottom third in terms of market capitalisation of
the financial industry. Distress in the smaller capitalisation financial industry
could lead to spill over to the broader market, as had happened with the onset
of the financial crisis in early 2007. Further, the FRM can be measured on a
global level. As Figure 2 shows, the 2012 Eurocentric crisis had ripple through
effects to the US’ financial system, where it did not lead to a recession as with
the Euro Area, but had increased financial market distress levels as per the
FRM. A global model can directly detect the banks via which the spillovers
into another region might happen.
The FRM’s forward looking character is a key ingredient to successful
employment of circuit breaking tools. By understanding which financial insti-
tutions and sectors are leading the increase in λj and FRM overall, potential
spill-over paths can be forecast and successfully put to a halt. This addresses
the clear need of interaction of monetary policy, financial stability related pol-
icy sets, but also fiscal policy as it relates to for example forced recapitalisation
of detected nodes in the system. So as outlined in Gauthier:2016 who use a
network based structural model to measure systemic risk and how it changes
with bank capital, the FRM can further improve macro-prudential financial
system capital requirements by detecting the specifically important companies
j which are at risk of creating spill-overs to the entire financial sector,that is
the activators, the activated entities and the co-stress IDs. Regulatory entities
are thereby able to limit contagion within a crisis scenario.
For the investment management industry, the FRM’s appeal is in its de-
tection of risk concentration in tail event network distress scenarios. Or in a
broader sense, an economies savings are better protected from tail event risks
when following similarly prudent measures on an investment portfolio level.
The FRM technology detects the financial institutions from which spill-overs
emerge, and which other financial institutions in the network will be detected.
As a result, the savings can be protected from clustered tail-even risk and
invested in nodes further away from the crisis’ epicentre. A given company’s
λj can therefore act as a penalising factor allocation of capital within a port-
folio management set-up and optimisation. Thereby the full distribution of
and interlinkages at all quantile levels can be taken into consideration for an
improved and more robust portfolio management strategy. As a consequence,
this adaptive portfolio risk management approach including quantile levels has
a self-regulating effect. Early detection of risky nodes and nearby co-stress IDs
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lead to earlier disinvestment and thus an early stoppage to systemic risk build-
ing up in a system. Prudent portfolio management quality assessment should
therefore include not only the standard risk and reward ratios, but also tail
event risk behaviour and exposures to it.
Together, both from a regulatory as well as a portfolio construction point
of view, the FRM technology provides a return based measure of systemic
risk without the pitfalls embedded in some of them, as have been outlined
in Loeffler:2018 A respective bank’s size in terms of market capitalisation
relative to others does not have an impact. The FRM is simply the mean of
all λj . Further, an increasingly infectious bank within the previously studied
contagion scenarios of 2008 for the Americas, and 2011 for Europe, indicates
that the FRM can detect activators and activated entities, and it is those
banks themselves that would be charged with holding more capital or similar
risk diminishing measures.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we propose and develop the Financial Risk Meter (FRM), a mea-
sure for systemic network risk in financial markets. The FRM is derived from
a distribution of penalty terms λ of the linear quantile Lasso regression in a
daily rolling window scheme. The FRM is simply the average of the λ series
over the 100 largest publicly traded financial institutions in the US and EU, re-
spectively.The up-to-date FRM can be found on http://hu.berlin/frm and
also on https://firamis.de. Modeling the joint tail event network distress
is however challenging given a high-dimensional node structure. The FRM is
useful since it boils down to a real number, allowing the authorities to man-
age the systemic risk effectively and further prepare for upcoming economic
recessions. The construction of FRM measures though is simple but concise
to encompass the joint tail event distress. The FRM technology is applied to
the asset class of government bonds. The derived Sovereign Risk Meter (SRM)
can be combined with the FRM, to construct a holistic systemic risk measure
which can be extended to include further asset classes. The FRM is an early
recession indicator as has been shown for the Americas and Europe. Further,
the FRM can help to detect distressed areas in the financial system network
consisting of banks and non-banks, and thereby can help prevent spill-overs
into the wider financial industry. Finally, FRM successfully measures tail event
risk, accounts for network dynamics characteristics and offers a flexible risk
measuring platform.
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6 Appendix
Table 2 FRM Macroeconomic risk factors in FRM@Americas and FRM@Europe
(a) FRM@Americas (b) FRM@Europe
S&P 500 Index Returns S&P Europe 600 Index Returns
CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) Returns Euro Stoxx 50 Volatility Index Returns
REIT Index Returns MSCI Europe REIT Index Returns
3 months Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
Differences
1 year German Treasury Constant Maturity
Rate Differences
3 months Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
to 10 year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
Spread Differences
German Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 1
to 10 year Slope Spread Differences
Moodys Seasoned Baa Corp Bond Yield
Spread to 10 year Treasury Constant Matu-
rity Rate Spread Differences
Barclays Bloomberg EuroAgg Corporate
Yield Spread to 10 year German Treasury
Constant Maturity Rate Spread Differences
10 year Italy Treasury to 10 year German
Treasury Constant Maturity Rate Spread Dif-
ferences
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Table 3 FRM Preparation, estimation and reporting algorithm steps
(a) FRM Statistics and Data
Obtain past and present index constituents over entire period
Load daily closing prices of selected companies
Load daily market capitalisation in USD
Load daily closing levels of exogenous macroeconomic risk factors
Merge matrix of prices and market capitalisation for all financial markets
Merge Stock price and macroeconomic risk factor level matrices
Calculate the daily return matrix for all selected financial companies and macroeconomic risk factors
function sorting market capitalisation (
sort market capitalisation table per trading day in descending order
determine company index number on descending order
determine respective companies market capitalisation values in USD
)
Save results in three matrices:
FRM Stock Market Returns
Market Capitapisation Index
Market Capitalisation Value
(b) FRM Statistics and Estimation
Load the Stock Returns Data Matrix for all K financial companies
Load the market capitalisation index for all financial companies, sorted by market capitalisation
Load the market capitalisation values for all financial companies, sorted by magnitude
Set the number of largest financial companies J ,
the estimation window size s,
tail risk level τ ,
number of iterations I
Determine the ending and start date
Count the number of trading days r between the selected ending and start dates
Determine the data matrix row index at the ending date
from start date to end date (
obtain the daily largest J companies’ index number
for each company j in J
create the daily data matrix of their stock price returns of the largest J and all L macroeconomic risk factors
estimate per company active set, λ and design matrix condition number c
Create a data matrix that collects all empirical results:
the matrix has r rows and K (K + 2) columns,
containing K2 columns for estimated parameters,
K columns for the estimated λ,
K columns for the estimated condition number c
for example:
FRMoAmericas contains K = 706 and the data matrix correspondingly is of dimension r × 499848
(c) FRM Results and Reporting
Load the FRM Empirical Results data matrix
calculate the FRM measure as the mean of λ for all J companies
calculate the count of company j being in the active set of all other companies J − 1
calculate the count of macroeconomic variable l being in the active set of all J companies
calculate the mean of c design matrix condition number
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Fig. 7 Depicting the network centrality and link strength
The FRM@Americas on 14 March 2008 (top) and 05 September 2008 (bottom)
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Fig. 8 Depicting the network centrality and link strength
The FRM@Europe on 20 January 2012
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Fig. 9 SRM@EuroArea from 2011 until 2019 for τ = 0.05
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Fig. 10 Ten year government bond yields for Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Germany
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Fig. 11 Average of FRM@Europe and SRM@EuroArea versus CISS
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Fig. 12 SRM@EuroArea constituent network total degree of centrality May 4th, 2015
Fig. 13 SRM@EuroArea constituent network total degree of centrality July 3rd, 2015
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Fig. 14 SRM@EuroArea constituent network total degree of centrality July 10th, 2019
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Fig. 15 FRM@iT raxx Eu Senior Financials, 25 to 30 financial institutions
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Fig. 16 FRM@iT raxx Eu Senior Financials adjacency matrix as of October 7th, 2019
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Fig. 17 FRM@iT raxx spill-over channel as of October 7th, 2019, activators Deutsche
Bank (DB) and Allianz (ALVGR)
Fig. 18 FRM@iT raxx Eu Senior Financials constituent network total degree of centrality
October 7th, 2019
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Fig. 19 The FRM-implied recession probability in the US
The implied recession probability from the fitted logistic regression, and dated NBER
recession periods
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Fig. 20 The FRM-implied recession probability in the Europe
The implied recession probability from the fitted logistic regression, and dated CEPR
recession periods
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3429549
FRM Financial Risk Meter 35
US Recession Probability
Year
R
ec
es
si
o
n
 P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 a
n
d
 F
R
M
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
0
.0
0
.2
0
.4
0
.6
0
.8
1
.0
Fig. 21 The FRM-implied recession probability in the US (S&P500)
The implied recession probability from the fitted logistic regression, and dated CEPR
recession periods
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Fig. 22 The FRM-implied recession probability in comparison in the US
NBER recession periods, FRM@Americas versus Smoothed US Recession Model, Yield
Curve Slope Model
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